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he Chinese auto indus-
try reached a major mile-
stone in 2009. After a 
decade of continuous 
growth, China became 
the largest car market in the world. In 2012, 
it also became the world's largest producer of 
emissions,  in part from the rapid spread of 
personal cars and gasoline-powered trucks and 
buses. The Chinese government understood that it had an environmental problem.
China’s twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015)—its core economic and social development road-
map—identified seven strategic emerging industries to which the country will devote enhanced 
policy and financial support. One of these is the alternative fuel vehicle industry, including electric 
vehicles (EVs). In 2009, the government launched a series of policies and incentives to promote de-
velopment of the EV sector. By June 2012, critical governmental targets were established: 500,000 
EVs (pure electric and hybrid electric vehicles) by 2015 and 5 million by 2020.
China’s ambitious goal-setting has happened amid doubts about the EV sector’s prospects for scal-
ing up internationally. Toyota, for example, recently delayed the launch of its electric vehicle, eQ, cit-
ing misjudgment of demand in the pure EV market coupled with continuing difficulties in improving 
battery technology. Switching a country or a region to a new generation of environmental technologies 
like electric vehicles requires the coordination of many actors—car manufacturers, battery develop-
ers, charging infrastructure providers, governments, and consumers. Such a challenge is likely too 
great for any private company—even one as large and path-breaking as Toyota—to accomplish on 
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The Chinese government’s effort to create an electric 
vehicle industry is a bold experiment in local and system- 
level innovation. It also provides a window into under-
standing the promise and peril of economic develop-
ment policies, both for China and for the rest of the world.
By Christopher Marquis, Hongyu Zhang, & Lixuan Zhou
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a worker at the eV development center of 
the Beijing automotive Group, which was 
created with Beijing government support.
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its own. To develop the EV industry, not only must there be a well-
designed and properly implemented government policy, coordina-
tion and cooperation between public and private sectors is essential.
China’s EV experience offers a rare window into understanding 
the promise and peril of enacting wide-scale, system-level change 
to deliver EVs to a mass market. Through centralized leadership and 
prior market-planning success, China has developed a unique strat-
egy of city-based pilot plans. The intent is to develop and refine new 
business models and markets, in order to introduce new technologies. 
Other countries have tried city-based experiments, but widespread 
adoption has been difficult in politically fragmented systems like the 
United States. China’s central government has a distinct advantage: It 
is able to launch system-level and sector-wide change in multiple cities 
and regions with no political opposition.
In this article, we investigate China’s emerging EV industry, focus-
ing on the continuing challenges to its strategy of using city-based pi-
lots. In 2009, four Chinese governmental ministries overseeing indus-
try and information technology, science and technology, finance, and 
national development and reform initiated the “Ten Cities, Thousand 
Vehicles” program. Initially, the program focused on developing 10 pi-
lot cities, each of which would launch 1,000 EVs into operation within 
three years.1 By 2011, the number of pilot cities had climbed to 25.
Yet results have fallen significantly short of the original targets. 
To understand why, we look at the experience of five representative 
cities: Beijing, which focused on creating public sector support of 
EVs; Shanghai, which focused on replicating international models; 
Shenzhen, the most successful pilot, which focused on creating a 
leasing model through strategic partnerships; Hangzhou, which 
has created a rental model; and Chongqing, which has developed 
fast-charging EV technology. Our aim is to understand system-
level change efforts more generally. We ask: How does selection by 
central planners compare to open competition in fostering system-
level innovation? And what do the unmet goals of the Ten Cities, 
Thousand Vehicles program say about system change in China and 
more broadly? By contrasting the rollouts in five different pilot cit-
ies, we also aim to shed light on how different models of systemic PH
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change fare when it comes to social and environmental innovations 
and to what degree reforms should be implemented by central plan-
ners (top-down) versus generated from local efforts (bottom-up).
SyStematic change through city-BaSed PilotS
Over the past 30 years, China has established a distinct economic 
development formula—an experimental strategy based on localized 
pilots to initiate systemic reforms, such as rural de-collectivization, 
foreign economic opening, and promotion of private business. Now 
standard in Chinese development, localized pilots were first con-
ceived by policymakers as macro-laboratories, where new solutions 
to economic or market problems could be tested, accumulated, and 
refined at the local level before being fed back into national policy 
formulation and subsequently rolled out more broadly.
The philosophy for the strategy was vividly expressed by Chinese 
political leader Deng Xiaoping as “crossing the river by feeling for 
the stones.” Unlike theory-based planning, this strategy is step-by-
step, highly pragmatic, fundamentally empirical, and implemented 
during its early stages without specific goals or procedures. Pilot ar-
eas, established with help from a central government, are designed 
to respond reflexively to changes during their own development. 
With the help of many preferential policies, experimental zones 
have adapted flexibly to a rapidly changing economic environment, 
developing at amazing speed.
Over several decades of practicing and refining this model, a num-
ber of signature elements have emerged to form a generalized process. 
One element is Beijing’s hands-off approach: The central government 
sometimes sets general goals for pilot areas, but does not get signifi-
cantly involved in the implementation process. A second element is 
the effective way that top-down and bottom-up processes have been 
blended, leveraging both central sponsorship and local initiative. The 
success of these pilots has depended on synergy between the two 
approaches. There are four important stages in the model: selection, 
evaluation and absorption, diffusion, and the learning feedback loop. 
(See “China’s Standard Experimental Strategy” above.)
Selection | A crucial stage of the experimental strategy has been 
the careful top-down selection of experimental sites where the central 
government can either test policy or try innovative practices. In one 
of the earliest examples, Shenzhen, a city far from Beijing but close 
to Hong Kong, was cautiously chosen in 1979 by the central govern-
ment as the site of the first special economic zone (SEZ). Because 
great risk is associated with delegating market-based innovation to 
any area, experimental pilots have typically been focused on areas 
where there is comparatively little political resistance, areas with 
economic characteristics conducive to successful reform, and cit-
ies that are geographically and economically representative of the 
country at large, yet far enough away from Beijing that potential 
political fallout is minimized. Pudong’s New Area in Shanghai, with 
its solid infrastructure and market-savvy cosmopolitan population, 
is such an area. It has become an important economic development 
zone over the past 20 years.
Evaluation and Absorption | The next stage is an evaluation 
and absorption process that combines bottom-up and top-down 
approaches. A specially assigned group composed of central gov-
ernment officials and experts evaluates the performance of pilots 
on behalf of the central government, to modify policies or identify 
more advanced practices. Recent efforts in national education sys-
tem reform followed this process. Several pilot areas and schools 
were established in light of the overall reform goals.2 After a year 
of operation, the pilot areas and schools reported their progress to 
central authorities, who then documented the most advanced prac-
tices for wide diffusion. Policies and practices can be spread to other 
areas only after they have been approved by the central government.
Diffusion | The final stage of the experimental strategy is gradual 
top-down diffusion. The central government makes great efforts to 
popularize the successful practices through media publicity, endorse-
ment by leading politicians, and government guides. The central gov-
ernment does not coerce local governments to implement the new 
practices, relying instead on publicity to signal its encouragement. 
For example, starting in 2001, the Ministry of Land and Resources 
initiated land expropriation to expand cities using an experimental 
strategy, which led to the Zhengdong New Area system of “harmo-
nious expropriation,” 3 whereby the government created incentives 
for people affected by land expropriation. After an intensive round 
of publicity promoting the new model, provinces such as Jiangsu, 
Hebei, Hubei, and Guizhou proposed similar models.
Learning Feedback Loop | A distinctive feature of the experimen-
tal strategy is the feedback loop between the evaluation and absorp-
tion process and diffusion. During diffusion, the central government 
pays close attention to how the practices or models are being imple-
mented, repeatedly re-evaluating them, to modify the models or adjust 
the speed and range of diffusion. Using pilots lowers the costs and 
risks of reform. It also reduces the severity of consequences in case 
the reform fails. Later participants in the reform process learn from 
trial groups and greatly reduce their own risks and costs.
the ten citieS, thouSand VehicleS Program
The original goal set by the central government in 2009 was to launch 
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collaboration to overcome technological roadblocks. The EVZONE 
is also planning to introduce both a short-term and a long-term EV 
rental business in Shanghai based on Bremen’s model, under which 
a shared car can in theory replace four to eight privately owned cars. 
The EVZONE expects to establish EV leasing stations in busy areas 
like office buildings, shopping malls, and major subway stations. 
Consumers can lease an EV with a membership card. Although 
the Shanghai model is innovative, little progress has been made in 
actual EV deployment.
Shenzhen: Cooperative Commercialization Model | Capitalizing 
on its industrial base and the presence of leading electric grid and bat-
tery companies, Shenzhen focused on finding a commercial way to 
spread EVs. The Shenzen government has fostered a financial leasing 
model with with state-owned enterprises Potevio New Energy and 
China Southern Power Grid. The Potevio venture has proven quite 
successful in public transportation, because it reduces the high cost 
of purchasing an EV. Typically, an EV bus costs $320,000. Even ex-
cluding $160,000 in subsidies from central and local governments 
($80,000 from each), the remaining $160,000 is still twice the cost 
of a conventional-fuel bus. In Potevio’s leasing model, the cost of the 
battery is separated to reduce capital expenditures; Potevio retains 
ownership of the battery (around $56,000) and leases it to the Shen-
zhen Bus Company. For the remaining $104,000 capital cost, Potevio 
offers loan guarantees. Moreover, because of support from the local 
government and BYD, a local battery manufacturer, Potevio is able 
to buy the batteries at a subsidized price. With its upfront financial 
burden alleviated, the bus company expects to roll out 2,050 electri-
cal buses by the end of 2012.
Hangzhou: Flexible Rental Model | Similar to Shanghai, Hang-
zhou has addressed the high cost of EVs by adopting a rental strategy. 
Hangzhou’s model is flexible 
because people can rent the 
car or the battery separately, 
significantly reducing cost. 
Hangzhou is the first city to 
adopt a battery rental system, 
providing free battery rental 
for three years or up to 60,000 
km for people who purchase 
EV cars. The city is now con-
structing a battery-charging 
infrastructure to provide 
consumers ready access to 
battery charging or swap-
ping stations.4 By June 2012, 
Hangzhou had constructed 
five charging stations, 62 bat-
tery-swapping and delivery 
stations, and 620 charging 
poles; Hangzhou plans to roll 
out 20,000 rental EVs by the 
end of 2013.5
Chongqing: Fast-Charg-
ing Model | Unlike other pi-
lot cities that have adopted 
1,000 EVs in each city. In practice, the pilot cities were subsequently 
able to set their own vehicle rollout agenda. This approach gave 
each city significant leeway to choose the model that best played 
to its strengths. (See “Five Electric Vehicle Pilot Programs” below.)
Beijing: State Leadership Model | In Beijing, the rollout of EVs has 
been spurred by the power of the government. The Beijing government 
relies heavily on preferential policies—such as reducing vehicle taxes 
and granting license plate lottery exemptions—to encourage public 
and private use of EVs in the capital city. A principal focus of the pilot 
is building a strong EV industrial base. Three EV industrial campuses 
have been set up by the Beijing government to promote research and 
development in EV technologies and attract leading automakers, bat-
tery makers, and other industry players. Perhaps most important, the 
local government has remained active in cooperating with and coordi-
nating important industry players to deploy EVs in the public sector. 
For example, the Yanqing government (a district in Beijing) has set up 
a joint venture with BAIC Foton to deploy EV taxis. The Yanqing gov-
ernment provided 50 percent of the capital and the charging facility 
and personnel, and BAIC Foton provided the other 50 percent capital 
investment and the taxis. By 2012, 150 electric taxis were operating, 
and another 50 were scheduled to be deployed by the end of the year.
Shanghai: Platform-Led Business Innovation Model | Shanghai 
was denoted an international EV pilot city by the central government, 
and so it has focused more on international cooperation. Shanghai 
plans to adapt a rental model borrowed from Bremen, Germany. In 
April 2011, the city set up an international EV demonstration zone, 
called EVZONE, in the Jiading district. Its goals were to provide a 
platform for testing and piloting the EV development model; to test 
innovations in vehicle performance, route design, and charging fa-
cility distribution; and to provide a site for auto manufacturer R&D 
Five electric Vehicle Pilot Programs
city model local StrengthS, hiStory, and geograPhic conditionS 
Beijing  
State Leadership 
Model
Government relies on preferential poli-
cies, and makes a concerted effort to 
create a strong EV industrial base.
Important industry players cooperate 
actively.
The capital city is good at regulation, and is  experienced in co-
operating with public and private sectors.
Beijing is strongly motivated to cultivate its image as an environ-
mentally friendly city.
Shanghai  
Platform-Led 
Business  
Innovation 
Model
EV international demonstration zone in 
Jiading provides a platform to promote 
EV development.
Planners intend to spread EV rental 
business across city.
With deep roots as an international coastal city, the people are 
generally more open-minded.
Private investment is strong.
The ability to develop private business, including infrastructure, 
human capital, and markets, is comprehensive.
Shenzhen  
Cooperative 
Commercializa-
tion Model
Multiple industrial players participate 
actively.
Potevio’s financial leasing model re-
duces cost of purchasing EVs.
Local government has wide experience in policy experiments and 
innovations.
A vibrant private economy with many strong companies, such as 
BYD, can support the EV industry.
Local government is determined to develop an EV industry and 
has already taken substantive steps.
hangzhou  
Flexible Rental 
Model
People can rent the car or the battery 
separately.
Hangzhou was the first city to adopt 
battery switching.
Local government gained a great deal of prior experience with the 
rental model when it developed a public bicycle rental system. 
Zhejiang Kandi Vehicles Co., a local manufacturer, provides EVs 
that are powered by Li-ion batteries that have a range of 100 km 
and a top speed of 70 km/hr.
chongqing  
Fast Charging 
Model
Chongqing is the only pilot city pursu-
ing fast-charging batteries.
The location in a mountainous area with few flat lands made bat-
tery switching difficult.
Nearby Three Gorges Reservoir Area and Three Gorge Power 
Grid are sources of a large amount of electrical power and robust 
electric grid.
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battery-swapping (Shenzhen and Hangzhou) or slow-charging 
stations (Beijing and Shanghai), Chongqing is piloting more grid-
intensive fast-charging EV technology. One reason is that Chong-
qing is near the robust Three Gorge Power Grid. Another is that the 
city is in the mountains and has few flat areas, which are necessary 
for battery swapping. Last, Chongqing is home to fast-charging-
auto manufacturers that provide industrial support for its strategy.
the challengeS oF city-BaSed PilotS
Although there have been notable successes, the EV rollout in China 
has met with a variety of challenges. Although standard economic 
theories would suggest that competition produces useful variations 
among models, which benefit later rounds of evaluation and absorp-
tion, there are also indications that competition has serious draw-
backs. First, when many cities are piloting programs, city leaders 
are more likely to overemphasize their progress so they will appear 
successful. On October 31, 2011, the four government ministries that 
initiated the Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles program held a special 
meeting and created a supervising team to monitor the progress of 
the 25 pilot cities. Chen Quanshi, vice director of State Key Labora-
tory of Automobile Safety and Energy, said that the biggest issue 
revealed during the evaluation was that local governments were 
inflating their EV projects’ successes, to increase their chances of 
winning further support.6 Many pilot cities put resources into the EV 
industry because it was a good opportunity to demonstrate 
an environmentally friendly image and therefore to get finan-
cial support. But some selected cities, such as Xiangfan and 
Nantong, have weak industrial foundations and questionable 
abilities and resources to produce and promote EVs. Their 
strategy has been to focus on receiving preferential policies 
and financial resources, as opposed to developing their EV 
adoption capability.
Another problem has been local protectionism. Under 
China’s standard experimental strategy model, the number of 
pilot sites is usually too small to invite comparisons between 
cities, and the evaluation process involves improvement and 
guidance for future rollouts. Because the Ten Cities, Thousand 
Vehicles program has included as many as 25 cities, however, 
competition for central government support and resources 
has forced local governments to become more self-serving. 
Many local governments have focused on developing stan-
dards and technologies that specifically benefit their own 
location and local companies, rather than working toward 
national or international standards and goals. In addition, 
some automakers complain that they are having, as Gaofeng, 
the vice president of Karry (a brand of the Chery Automobile 
Co.), put it, “an increasingly tough time selling [their] EVs 
in other cities, because of huge local financial subsidies for 
locally produced EVs.” 7 An industry expert who preferred 
to remain anonymous asserted, “The reason Beijing has not 
sold a single EV in the private sector is that there is no place 
to buy one. The Beijing government has made it very difficult 
for BYD to sell its EVs here.” Thus the Ten Cities, Thousand 
Vehicles program is skewed toward locally focused goals 
and local firms rather than a long-term national agenda for 
developing China’s EV industry. As another interviewee said, “The 
central government and local governments often have misaligned 
incentives and goals.”
Classical and neoclassical economists may find nothing wrong 
with policy makers adopting comparative advantage as a guiding 
principle, nor with governments emphasizing their strengths when 
selecting development strategies in a competitive field. But in a do-
mestic program—one that has the explicit goal of benefitting the 
population as a whole—too much local competition complicates 
rather than facilitates the development of a national formula. With-
out strong guidance from the central government, the city pilots lose 
sight of overarching goals and produce specialized local standards 
that are not widely applicable. As a result, opportunities for system-
level learning are reduced.
And unlike the standard city-based pilots—such as special eco-
nomic zones and coastal economic development zones, where the gov-
ernment has been more strategic in selecting appropriate test sites—
EV pilot cities are developing idiosyncratic plans specifically suited to 
their local histories. Shanghai, the only EV international pilot city, has 
deep roots in internationalization that facilitate its adoption of the 
Bremen model. Hangzhou has adopted a flexible rental model largely 
because it had already developed a successful bicycle rental system.
Geographic condition is another crucial factor in determining 
models. For example, most pilot cities prefer battery-swapping or 
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slow-charging technology because of safety and management con-
siderations, such as saving energy and making full use of the power 
grid. Chongqing, however, uses a fast-charging method because of its 
unique location near the massive Three Gorges hydroelectric dam. 
These geographic idiosyncrasies present challenges to establishing 
a national standard, creating consistent evaluation, and replicating 
the various models across China.
Deep roots in specific local conditions make it difficult to identify 
a model that can be recommended for national diffusion. To date, 
Shenzhen is considered the most successful by many observers. Nev-
ertheless, it enjoys several internal strengths that are difficult for other 
cities to replicate in the short term. First, Shenzhen has an excellent 
industrial foundation that was already focused on developing EVs 
with the support of central enterprises, such as Potevio and China 
Southern Power Grid, as well as of private firms like BYD. One of the 
interviewees from another city complained, “Shenzhen’s model ap-
pears unrealistic to replicate, as Potevio is basically converting some 
of CNOOC’s gas stations into EV charging stations. For other cities, 
such construction or conversion would definitely require participa-
tion from the grid companies.” Second, battery use is greatly influ-
enced by weather and temperature conditions, making it unfeasible 
for China’s colder areas to duplicate the Shenzhen model.
Because of these issues, questions have been raised about the future 
success of the Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles program. One potential 
roadblock will be standardization. As one local government official 
who preferred to remain anonymous lamented, “Standards by the 
central government on EVs were launched quite late, and before that 
there were already local standards. So enforcing overall standards 
is difficult.” A consensus has been reached among various industry 
players that EV development needs uniform industrial standards for 
battery types and body materials. They also need a standard design for 
public EVs (such as buses) to improve trip range, weight, and safety. 
Yet because of unclear guidance from the central government, local 
protectionism, and geographic differences, local governments have 
used many different standards to achieve the 1,000-vehicle goal.
learning From the ten citieS,  
thouSand VehicleS Program
The Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles program, a variation of China’s 
standard experimental strategy, has many advantages, such as gen-
erating local government enthusiasm and providing a greater va-
riety of models for subsequent EV evaluation and absorption. But 
the program has not led to a set of standards or a single model that 
can be rolled out broadly.
The development of EVs in China demonstrates the limitations 
of government-driven implementation. The central governing body 
needs to be clear in its decision-making and communication, par-
ticularly during the selection phase. Without initial clarity, both 
the public and private sectors in the EV pilot cities have relied too 
much on later signals from the central government, taking a “wait 
and see” approach. The public sector's delay in issuing crucial plans 
has eroded the enthusiasm of some private automakers and battery-
makers, which have become reluctant to involve themselves in future 
planning. In turn, the private sector’s decreasing involvement has 
tempered government enthusiasm for developing the EV industry.
The models that developed from the pilots have been shaped by 
the institutional factors at each location; local circumstances need 
to be taken into account much earlier in the process and steps should 
be taken to discourage excessive intercity competition. Initial evi-
dence suggests that the various EV models reflect historical differ-
ences, conflicting governmental priorities, and existing corporate 
infrastructure—all of which significantly limit standardization and 
potential future national rollout. We believe experimental models 
work best in China, and elsewhere, when there is an active and rig-
orous site selection process that takes these factors into account.
Although 2012 was officially the concluding year of the Ten Cit-
ies, Thousand Vehicles program, the central government still has 
much to accomplish before arriving at a nationwide model. Much 
has been written in the West about the importance of centralized 
policy and implementation for China’s economic successes over the 
past 30 years, but the execution has frequently been through city-
based experiments and decentralized refinement before national 
rollout. China’s city pilot strategy has not jump-started a national 
EV industry, which we believe may have to do with how the EV roll-
out varied from prior city-based pilots.
An additional reason for the lack of progress in developing a na-
tional model may be the rise of significant independent power bases 
in Chinese cities. Over the past two decades, local power bases in 
China have increasingly focused on local development, making it 
difficult to execute the types of centrally coordinated strategies that 
worked for China in the past. Today, city and regional governments 
are set on meeting their own needs and are prone to protectionist 
tactics. The expansion of the Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles pro-
gram is thus a lesson in how conflicting incentives can lead to local 
interests taking advantage of central government goals, potentially 
undermining the implementation of a national-level experimental 
program. If China is going to maintain its growth trajectory, the 
central government will have to find a new way to balance or even 
harness these local interests. n
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